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Abstract
We consider the problem of identifying the source of an epidemic, spreading
through a network, from a complete observation of the infected nodes in a snapshot
of the network. Previous work on the problem has often employed geometric,
spectral or heuristic approaches to identify the source, with the trees being the most
studied network topology. We take a fully statistical approach and derive novel
recursions to compute the Bayes optimal solution, under a susceptible-infected
(SI) epidemic model. Our analysis is time and rate independent, and holds for
general network topologies. We then provide two tractable algorithms for solving
these recursions, a mean-field approximation and a greedy approach, and evaluate
their performance on real and synthetic networks. Real networks are far from
tree-like and an emphasis will be given to networks with high transitivity, such as
social networks and those with communities. We show that on such networks, our
approaches significantly outperform geometric and spectral centrality measures,
most of which perform no better than random guessing. Both the greedy and
mean-field approximation are scalable to large sparse networks.
1 Introduction
Modern transportation networks have had profound effects on geographical spread of infectious
diseases [1, 2] giving rise to complicated epidemic evolutions [3]. These evolutions can be modeled
as dynamic processes on transportation networks. The epidemic spread on networks can take other
forms, such as outbreaks of foodborne diseases [4], intercontinental cascade of failures among
financial institutions [5, 6], computer malware propagation on the interent and mobile networks [7, 8]
spread of targeted fake news [9, 10] and rumors [11] on social media, especially during presidential
elections [12–14]. In response to an adverse diffusion on a network, it is critical to trace back sources
to enable appropriate prevention and containment of the spread [15]. Inferential methods have been
developed to locate the source of foodborne diseases [16, 17] and influenza pandemics [18, 19]. In the
context of online social networks, the spread of misinformation can be limited by the identification
of influential users [20, 21]. Source recovery can also be used to assess the power of diffusions in
generating anonymity in network protocols [22].
The epidemic source identification problem has received considerable attention in the past decade.
Given a snapshot of the infected nodes in a network, the task is to discover who has originated the
epidemics. Since the seminal work of Shah and Zaman [23], numerous attempts have been made
to address the question and its extensions [24–29]. By now, there are multiple methods that show
satisfactory results in limited experimental setups or have proven guarantees in restricted network
topologies [30]. However, identifying the source under general conditions still remains a difficult task.
Even under fairly simple models such as the Independent Cascade (IC) dynamics, the problem of
optimal recovery appears to be NP-hard in infection size [31]. The theoretical guarantees for optimal
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and consistent recovery are restricted to regular infinite trees [23, 26], and as we show in this paper,
the popular and well-cited methods are quite unreliable in a wide range of real networks.
Source identification has remained largely unsolved and poorly understood for real complex networks.
As we will show through experiments in Section 5, in real networks, even the optimal Bayes estimator
applied to small infected sets has difficulty narrowing down to the true source. It is thus important to
recover as much information from the likelihood of the model as possible. We develop techniques
for computing the full likelihood of the infection, as opposed to identifying the most likely sample-
path [26]. Moreover, we fully exploit the information from the boundary of the infection set, in
addition to the structure inside the infected subgraph. This idea has been pointed out before [32],
but has been mostly neglected by subsequent work; cf. [29, 24]. We develop all these ideas without
restricting the structure of the network to trees. Our framework also easily extends to the case where
there are multiple infecting sources (Appendix A).
In this paper, we develop statistical algorithms that outperform the state-of-the-art in a wide range of
network topologies. Our contributions are distinct in several ways:
1. Our methods are parameter-free, meaning that they do not require knowing the duration of the
epidemic or how fast it grows.
2. We show that the exact maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of the source—or equivalently the
Bayes optimal solution under uniform prior—can be written as a dynamic programming (DP),
with easily computable coefficients based on the adjacency matrix of the network.
3. We develop two schemes to approximate the DP: an efficient greedy elimination (GE), and a novel
mean-field approximation (MFA) of the likelihood, computed by solving a linear system.
4. Our approximations are more disciplined than existing approaches. They do not impose restrictions
on the topology of the network. Nor do they appeal to the partial likelihood of the candidate
infecting sets. This is in contrast to the use of spanning trees to deal with general topologies [23]
or the path-based approaches that rely on the likelihood of individual paths from potential sources
to the infected set [26].
We will show that when applied to real networks, both approximation schemes (MFA and GE)
outperform various geometric and spectral approaches, most of which perform no better than random
guessing. We also show that even for basic models of real networks, e.g., models with community
structure, most existing methods dramatically fail. The improvement in performance is most sig-
nificant for the networks with many cycles, including social networks that are known to have high
transitivity. In terms of computational efficiency, both the greedy and mean-field approximations are
superior to the state-of-the-art likelihood-based and spectral approaches and comparable to centrality-
based methods. In addition, the mean-field algorithm is easily parallelizable through standard linear
algebraic routines and can be used to tackle very large-scale epidemics on real networks.
Related work. Most of the existing literature on the source identification problem are based on
a SIR dynamic where the infection spreads with an exponential rate proportional to the number of
infected neighbors. All nodes are susceptible to the infection and once infected may recover with a
fixed exponential rate [33]. Moreover, the spread of infection through edges are mutually independent.
Different variations of SIR may assume that no recovery is possible (SI) or the recovered is not
immune to iterated infections (SIS).
Shah and Zaman [23] considered the SI dynamics and proposed the Rumor Centrality (RC), which
counts the permitted permutations, a.k.a. infection paths, inside the infected subgraph. Their linear
time algorithm is an optimal estimator in regular trees and enjoys strong theoretical properties in
such idealized settings [34]. Zhou and Ying [26] consider SIR dynamics on a tree and show that
the most likely infection path is rooted at a Jordan center (JC) of the infected set O, that is, a node
with minimum eccentricity (i.e., maximum distance to others). It has been shown [26, 34] that in
regular trees, eccentricity ranking generates, with high probability, a confidence set containing the
true source, whose size does not grow with the infection size.
The Dynamic Message Passing (DMP) was proposed in [25] as an approximation of the maximum
likelihood estimator in discrete SIR epidemics, by assuming that the marginal probabilities of infection
for each node are independent. Despite compelling performance, DMP is computationally intensive
and impractical for large networks with moderately dense structures, even for small infection sets.
A spectral algorithm, called Dynamical Age (DA) was introduced in [24], based on measuring the
sensitivity of the maximum eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix to the elimination of each node in
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the infection set. The algorithm was mainly developed to discover the initial node in a growing
preferential attachment model. Another spectral method for the discrete SI model is proposed in [29].
2 Source detection in SI epidemics
We consider a continuous-time susceptible-infected (SI) epidemic [33] with rate of infection β,
on a static undirected network G(V,E) with known edge set E and V = [n]. At time zero, all
nodes but the source are in the susceptible state. Infection is a terminal state and susceptible nodes
are exposed to the infection at an exponential rate proportional to the number of their infected
neighbors. More precisely, given that nodes I are infected at some time t, we run exponential clocks
Tj ∼ Exp(β vol(I, j)) for all j ∈ Ic and the first to expire determines the next infected node: If
j∗ = argminj Tj , then the dynamics move to the infected set I ∪ {j∗} at time t + Tj∗. It is clear
that the contagion will eventually spread through the entire graph.
The infection source or patient zero, denoted as i∗, is unknown. What we observe is a snapshot of
the contagion at some time t, meaning the entire set of infected nodes at that time, which we denote
by O. The objective is to find i∗ ∈ O or form a confidence set for i∗ with desired false exclusion
probability. Our focus here will be on the single source setting, but the analysis is extensible to the
multi-source setting (cf. Section A).
Notation. We write A ∈ {0, 1}n×n for the adjacency matrix of the network and vol(I, J) :=∑
i∈I,j∈J Aij for the volume of a cut in the network between subsets I, J ⊂ [n] of nodes. For
singleton subsets, we often drop the braces, e.g., vol(I, j) := vol(I, {j}) and O \ j = O \ {j}.
2.1 Time and rate invariant analysis
We start by examining the probability of observing a particular set of infected nodes given a starting
source. Let us introduce a parameter-free formulation of the problem (i.e. not dependent on rate β
and time t) that will be the foundation for our analysis of the continuous SI dynamics. The idea has
been introduced in [32]. We generalize it to multiple sources and find forward and backward dynamic
programming formulations that allow us to derive efficient approximations.
Suppose that, at some point in time, the infection reaches I ⊂ [n]. Let O ⊂ [n] be some superset of
I . We are interested in computing ρI→O, the chance that all the nodes in O are infected before any
node outside. More precisely, let
ρI→O := P
(
O is infected before Oc | I is infected). (1)
We refer to ρI→O as the transition probabilities. Note that these transition probabilities are indepen-
dent of the infection source. Given that in a snapshot of the contagion, nodes I are infected, ρI→O
determines how likely it is that in some future snapshot, O is the set of infected nodes. The Markov
property of (continuous-time) SI dynamics allows us to define ρI→O without reference to the source,
or the time of the first snapshot. We will also show that these probabilities do not depend on the
infection rate or the time of the second snapshot.
2.2 Statistical Inference
Given the observed (random) infected set O, the function I 7→ ρI→O is the likelihood of the model.
Writing LO(I) := ρI→O for this likelihood, we observe that LO(I) = 0 for all I not contained
in O. So, we can restrict L(·) to all subsets of O. When dealing with the single-source setup, we
restrict the parameter space to I = {i} and with some abuse of notation write ρi→O for ρ{i}→O, and
LO(i) = ρi→O, i ∈ [n] for the likelihood.
We can further consider a Bayesian setup by putting a uniform prior on the source (i.e., uniform over
[n]). The Bayesian setup allows us to consider various notions of optimality by changing the loss
function. Letting i∗ be the random initial source, we have a joint distribution on (i∗, O). Then the
posterior probability that the source is i, given that we observed infected nodes O is
pi := P(i∗ = i | O) = ρi→O∑
j∈O ρj→O
1{i ∈ O}.
Therefore, the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate of the source is i∗MAP = argmaxi ρi→O which
minimizes the probability of error. That is, i∗MAP minimizes P(ˆi 6= i∗) for any estimator iˆ = iˆ(O). In
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some applications, the graph geodesic distance (dG) to the source determines the error of estimation.
In that case, the Bayes optimal estimator is i∗dist = argmini
∑
j∈O distG(i, j) ρj→O. It is not hard to
see that i∗dist minimizes E[dG(ˆi, i∗)] among all possible estimators iˆ.
A third choice is to output a ranking instead of a single source. In this case an estimator is formally a
permutation σˆ = σˆO on [n], suppressing the dependence on O for simplicity. We can then consider
the rank loss `(σˆ, i∗) = σˆ(i∗), and we call the associated risk the expected (source) rank = Eσˆ(i∗).
The corresponding optimal Bayes estimator is obtained by minimizing the posterior risk:
σˆ∗ := argmin
σ:[n]→[n]
E[σ(i∗) | O].
Noting that E[σ(i∗) | O] =
∑
i σ(i) pi, the optimal estimator in this case is the ranking that sorts pi
into descending order, i.e., σˆ∗(ji) = i where pj1 ≥ pj2 ≥ · · · ≥ pjn .
Remark 1. The distance loss might be suitable in some applications, but in general it is a poor
measure if the goal is to reveal the actual source. This is especially true in small world networks,
including most social networks, where the expected distance between any pair of nodes is small. On
the other extreme, in terms of the precision in recovering the source, is the zero-one loss which is too
stringent. The rank loss can be considered a more robust version of the zero-one loss, and we will be
our main evaluation measure.
3 Exact likelihood computation
The Bayesian estimators introduced in Section 2.2 require us to evaluate the posterior probabilities
(pi), or equivalently the likelihood values ρj→O for all j ∈ O. The main difficulty of the source
identification problem is that computing the likelihood is itself challenging. We now develop exact
equations that allow us to recursively compute the likelihood values LO(I) for all subsets I ⊂ O.
Dynamic programming. To begin, note that ρO→O = 1 for any O ⊂ [n]. In addition, ρI→O = 1
whenever O corresponds to a connected component of G. We develop two dynamic programming
expressions for ρI→O for general I ⊂ O:
Proposition 1. For I ⊂ O ⊂ [n], the probabilities ρI→J defined in (1) satisfy the forward program
ρI→O =
∑
j∈O\I
vol(I, j)
vol(I, Ic)
ρI∪j→O (2)
and the backward program
ρI→O =
∑
j∈O\I
ρI→O\j
vol(O \ j, j)
vol(O \ j, (O \ j)c) . (3)
In the forward programming (2), j effectively iterates over the boundary of I in O, as vol(I, j) = 0
if j is outside that boundary. Therefore, the running time of the forward programming benefits from
the sparsity of the network. Unlike the forward programming, the iteration over j in (3) cannot be
restricted to a smaller set. A corollary of Proposition 1 is that the transition probabilities ρI→J are
not affected by the rate and the duration of the infection.
Let us now observe some connection with the path-based analysis. A permitted permutation or
an infection path starting at a node i∗, refers to a permutation σ of nodes with σ1 = i∗, and such
that σk+1 is connected to at least one node in {σ1, . . . , σk}, for all k ∈ [|σ| − 1]. Notice that the
probability of observing a given infection path is
P
(
path σ observed | σ1 = i∗
)
=
|σ|−1∏
k=1
vol(σ[k], σk+1)
vol(σ[k], σ
c
[k])
(4)
where σI := (σi | i ∈ I). As noted in [32], one can obtain the transition probability ρ{i∗}→O by
summing (4) over all infection paths σ such that σ1 = i∗ and {σ1, . . . , σk} = O. Our recursive
representation is novel, avoids these explicit summations, and will be key in deriving approximation
schemes for ρI→O in Section 4.
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Path-based approaches such as Jordan center [26] forgo computing the complete likelihood (i.e., avoid
summing the odds of all infection paths) and instead find the most probable path, that is, one that
maximizes (4). In contrast, equations (2) and (3) compute the complete likelihood of the infection
set, which has the following advantages over the path-based likelihood: It fully exploits the structure
of the graph inside the infection set, not just a spanning tree or a permitted permutation of nodes in
the infected subgraph. Moreover, it takes into account the boundary of the infected subgraph via
vol(I, Ic).
NP-hardness. The recursions we derived are a dynamic programming (DP) solution that computes
the likelihood more efficiently, by avoiding the direct summation over all possible paths. More
precisely, one can obtain the optimal likelihood values by solving recursion (2) backwards: Starting
from ρO→O = 1, we can determine ρI→O for all proper subsets I ⊂ O of maximal size (i.e.,
|I| = |O| − 1) and then all the proper subsets of those at the previous stage and so on. However, this
DP procedure may still take O(2|O|) time in the worst case. It is an interesting open question whether
polynomial-time solutions for computing the likelihood or its maximum exist.
Although it has been shown in [23] that for infinite regular trees, computing the likelihood reduces to
enumerating all the infection paths from i to O, and therefore a polynomial-time algorithm exists in
that case, the behavior of the exact likelihood under more general network topologies is much more
difficult to investigate. Researchers have implicitly assumed the problem to be hard beyond trees and
have resorted to approximations that are often based on heuristics. In the next section, we propose
disciplined approximation schemes that yield much more accurate results under realistic classes of
networks.
4 Approximations
We now provide two approximations to the likelihood function LO(I) based on the exact dynamic
programming developed in Proposition 1.
Greedy Elimination (GE). We can obtain a singleton source set I = {i} that maximizes ρI→O
with greedy elimination of elements in O. The algorithm we propose is based on the backward
recursion (3) and is detailed in Algorithm 1. We start with O0 := O and consider all maximal
proper subsets of O0 that induce a connected subgraph of G. Among those, we choose the one that
maximizes the transition probability to O0, i.e. ρO0\j→O0 = vol(O0 \ j, j)/ vol(O0 \ j, (O0 \ j)c).
Suppose that O1 := O0 \ j∗ is the maximizer. Next, we iterate the same procedure for O1 and so
forth, until we reach a singleton set I := O|O|−1. The procedure has an O(k2m) runtime where
k = |O|and m is the number of edges in the infected subgraph, GO.
GE has a Bayesian justification. Let O˜k be the random infected set after k steps. Suppose that we
want to find the MAP for O˜k−1 given O˜k. The Bayesian posterior probability is
P(O˜k−1 = O\j | O˜k = O) ∝ ρO\j→O · P (O˜k−1 = O\j).
Whenever GO\j is connected, the prior is positive. GE finds a proxy for MAP through maximizing
the evidence and ensuring the prior is positive.
Algorithm 1 has similarities with finding the most likely path from a source to the observed snapshot.
Chang et. al. [32] propose a similar path-based search called GSBA. They start from each node in O
and approximate the most likely path and use it as a proxy to the most likely source. Algorithm 1,
however, does this greedy search in a backward fashion.
Mean-field Approximation (MFA). We now approximate ρI→O by the mean-field technique. The
idea is to treat the set function I 7→ ρI→O as if it was a distribution (or measure) onO and approximate
it by the product of its marginals. Fix a subset O ⊂ [n]. For any I ⊂ O, let xI = (xIj )j∈O be the
binary representation of I , i.e. xIj = 1{j ∈ I} for any j ∈ O. We find α0 and (bj)j∈O such that
ρ̂I→O = α0
∏
j∈O
b
xIj−1
j (5)
is a good approximation to ρI→O for all I ⊂ O, in the sense of minimizing the quadratic deviation
from the solution of the recursion (2). First note that α0 = 1 since ρO→O = 1. Next, we plug-in
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Algorithm 1 Greedy Elimination
Input: Graph G([n], E) and O ⊂ [n].
Output: i∗GE ∈ O.
1: O0 := O
2: for i := 0 to |O| − 2 do
3: O′i := {j ∈ Oi : GOi\j remains connected}
4: j∗ := argmaxj∈O′i
vol(Oi \ j, j)
vol(Oi \ j, (Oi \ j)c) .
5: Oi+1 := Oi \ j∗.
6: end for
7: i∗GE := the single element in O|O|−1.
Algorithm 2 Mean-Field Approximation
Input: Graph G([n], E) and O ⊂ [n].
Output: i∗MFA ∈ O.
1: Compute S, z as defined in (7).
2: b̂ := S−1z.
3: i∗MFA := argmaxj∈O b̂j .
ρ̂I→O into the forward recursion, to get
vol(I, Ic) ρ̂I→O −
∑
j∈O\I
vol(I, j) ρ̂I∪{j}→O = 0.
Dividing both sides by
∏
j∈O\I bj gives vol(I, I
c)−∑j∈O\I vol(I, j) bj = 0. These equations in
general cannot be satisfied exactly for all I ⊂ O. Instead, letting b = (bj)j∈O, we solve the following
least-squares problem:
b̂ ∈ argmin
b
∑
I: I⊂O
(
vol(I, Ic)−
∑
j∈O\I
vol(I, j) bj
)2
= argmin
b
‖Qb− r‖22 (6)
where Q ∈ R(2|O|−1)×|O| and r ∈ R(2|O|−1)×1 are defined as follows:
QI,j = 1{j 6∈ I} vol(I, j), ∀ I ⊂ O, j ∈ O, rI = vol(I, Ic), ∀ I ⊂ O.
The solution of (6) satisfies the normal equations QTQb̂ = QTr. The following proposition shows
that QTQ and QTr can be computed efficiently. Let A be the adjacency matrix of the network.
Proposition 2. The solution b̂ of (6) satisfies the linear system Sb̂ = z with S and z given by
S = Ξ
(
AOO +A
2
OO −AOO  (u1T + 1uT ) + uuT
) ∈ R|O|×|O|,
z = (1Tu+ 21Tv)u− 2v  u+ 2(AOO v + u)
(7)
where u := AOO1 and v = AOOc1. Here  is the element-wise matrix product, Ξ(·) is a matrix
operator that returns the same matrix with double the diagonal entries, and 1 is the vector of all
ones.
See Appendix B.2 for the proof. Proposition 2 shows that the mean-field approach reduces to solving
a linear system of equations in |O| variables, a task with much better computational complexity than
solving the original recursion. Both S and z can be computed in at most O(|O|2) time. In the cases
where A is sparse (which often the case for real networks), S will be a rank-one perturbation of a
sparse matrix (both AOO and A2OO will be sparse), hence solving the resulting system is often much
faster than the worst-case, i.e., faster than O(|O|3).
5 Simulations
The methods proposed in this paper, the Greedy Elimination (GE) and the Mean Field Approximation
(MFA), have reasonable runtimes compared to popular source identification procedures and show
superior performance in source identification. In this section, we make a comparison based on these
two measures on real and synthetic networks. As discussed in Section 2.2, we consider ranking
estimators (i.e., those outputting a permutation of the nodes according to their likelihood of being
the source) and focus on the rank loss. If the method does not return a ranking, we tweak it to do
so. We evaluate the methods based on expected rank R, the expectation of the rank of the actual
source among the list of candidates (cf. Section 2.2). We normalize to get a number in [0,1], with
zero corresponding to perfect recovery, i.e., we use (R− 1)/n.
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(a) Regular tree (b) Random tree
(c) Internet AS (d) US West Power Grid
Figure 1: Plots of the expected relative rank versus the infection size for low-transitivity networks.
Table 1: Network statistics
Network n
mean max clust.
deg. deg. coeff.
Internet 10670 4.0 2312 0.01
Power 4941 3.0 19 0.1
Wiki vote 7066 29.0 1065 0.13
UCSC68 8979 50.0 454 0.17
UC64 6810 46.0 660 0.19
DC-SBM 1962 66.0 897 0.3
We consider a variety of real and simulated networks.
Our selection includes an Internet Autonomous Sys-
tem [35, 36], US west-coast power grid [37], two
Facebook-100 networks [38, 39], called UC64 and
UCSC68, and a Wikipedia voting network [40]. In
addition, we present our results on a number of syn-
thetic networks that are well studied in the literature,
including regular trees, random trees, and degree-
correlated stochastic block models (DC-SBM) [41].
Table 1 summarizes the statistics on the largest con-
nected component of these networks. The regular
tree is of degree 3 and depth 10. The random tree
has 500 nodes. For the DC-SBM network, we gen-
erate from a 3-community planted partition version, i.e., E[Aij ] = θiθjPij where Pij = 0.5 if nodes
i and j are in the same community and Pij = 0.02 if they are in different communities. The degree
parameters θi are generated from a rescaled Pareto distribution with α = 2 and threshold = 1.
The results are illustrated in Figures 1, 2. The methods we consider besides the optimal Bayes
solution (BO), the MFA, and the GE are the Rumor Centrality (RC), the Degree Centrality (DC)
and the Jordan Center (JC). We have also run the Dynamical Age (DA), but due to its overall poor
performance and its computational complexity, we have omitted it from the plots. Our selection of
the methods loosely follows the methods surveyed in [30]. Each curve shows the performance of one
method for different values of the infection size, 2 ≤ |O| ≤ 300. Each point is an average over 500
infection paths rooted at random sources. To avoid an unreasonable computation time, we skip the
optimal Bayes for the infected sets of size greater than 10. The BO curve serves as the benchmark for
the best achievable performance. Note that even the optimal solution needs to output a large set to
catch the source, signifying the inherent difficulty of the problem.
Rumor and Jordan centralities perform optimally on regular trees in Figure 1a, as expected by the
theory [23, 26], although the network is not exactly an infinite tree. Notice that RC, JC, and BO
overlap for infection sizes not exceeding the depth of the tree. Degree centrality also appears as a
close competitor in this figure. Moving to other networks, however, these popular methods do not
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(a) UCSC68 (b) UC64
(c) Wiki vote (d) DC-SBM
Figure 2: Plots of the expected relative rank versus the infection size for high-transitivity networks.
perform better than random guessing. For all three, the expected relative rank is close to 0.5, even in
a random tree. The plots in this section show that, despite their popularity, the RC and JC are quite
unreliable for source recovery.
Among our proposed methods, MFA outperforms RC, JC, and DC in Figures 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d. MFA
finds the true source, on average, in its top 30% guesses. The networks with suprior MFA performance
have highest transitivity (aka clustering coefficient) in Table 1, that is, many triangles among triples
of nodes. Transitivity has been studied extensively and it distinguishes human social networks from
random trees and less cyclical networks, such as water distribution systems and traffic network. In
this sense, MFA is suitable for rumor source detection in social networks.
GE is the global winner, except in regular trees (Figure 1a). We were surprised that a greedy algorithm
had such a widespread success. GE not only performs well in highly transitive networks, but it also
outperforms RC, JC, and DC on random trees (Figure 1b) and less transitive networks (Figures 1c,
1d).
Figure 3: Runtime in seconds at infection size 10.
Figure 3 illustrates the runtimes (on the log
scale) for a single run on the UC64 network,
when the infection size is 10 (the maximum size
for which the Bayesian results are available).
Degree centrality is the fastest, followed by RC,
JC, MFA and GE, all four having comparable
speed, with RC and JC having a slight edge. BO
is about 10 times slower and its runtime grows
exponentially with infection size.
Based on these results, we advocate for the use
of GE as the main tool for identifying sources of
epidemics, regardless of the network topology or
the nature of the epidemics (rumor propagation,
disease contagion, etc.). MFA should be applied
with caution. It is superior in social (transitive)
networks, and attractive for its simplicity and
the potential for parallelism.
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A Multi-source Extension
The inference problem discussed in Section 2.2 immediately extends to the multi-source situations.
Consider the case were more than one independent source, denoted by I∗, initiate the infection
dynamics. Due to the Markovian nature of the dynamics, the infection path that leads to some set
I does not influence the value of ρI→O. Hence, Proposition 1 also describes the likelihood of the
transition from the source set I∗ to a snapshot O.
If we know that there are s original sources, e.g. |I∗| = s, with a uniform prior on the patient zeros,
the Bayesian solution would be characterized by the optimization
I∗MAP = argmax
I⊂O, |I|=s
ρI→O (8)
To compute this MAP estimate, we can still use the DP solution in Proposition 1, but we do not need
to compute ρI→O for |I| < s. Thus, the multi-source problem is in a sense “easier”, especially when
s ≈ |O|, since one can terminate the recursion earlier (i.e., the case s = 1 is the hardest).
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us first recall a known fact about the exponential distribution:
Fact 1. Let Ti ∼ Exp(βi) be a collection of independent exponential variables. Then,
P
(
Ti < min
j 6=i
Tj
)
=
βi∑
j βj
.
The forward programming (2) is an application of the law of total probability in the following sense:
The event that nodes in O \ I are infected before any other node in Ic splits into sub-events that each
node in O \ I is infected before those in Oc and we have
ρI→O =
∑
j∈O\I
ρI→I∪j · ρI∪j→O
where we have also used the Markov property of SI dynamics to split the probabilities on the RHS
into the products. The ratio in (2) corresponds to the transition probability from I to I ∪ j, that is
ρI→I∪j . Indeed, given that I is infected, we run exponential clocks Tj ∼ Exp(β vol(I, j)) and the
first to expire determines the next infected node. By Fact 1, this happens for any node j ∈ Ic with
probability probability ∝j β vol(I, j). Thus,
ρI→I∪j =
β vol(I, j)∑
j′ β vol(I, j
′)
=
vol(I, j)
vol(I, Ic)
.
This proves the forward programming. The backward programming, on the other hand, connects
ρI→O to ρI→O\j and is proved similarly. Basically, the event of visiting O can be divided into
sub-events based on the last node in O that is infected.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove the following alternative expressions for S = (Sjj′)|O|×|O| and z = (zj)|O|,
Sjj′ :=
{
dO\j′(j) · dO\j(j′) + vol(2)O\{j,j′}(j, j′) j 6= j′
2dO(j) · [dO(j) + 1] j = j′
zj :=
[
vol(O\j) + 2 vol ((O\ j)c, O\ j)]dO(j)
+ 2 vol
(
adjO(j), (O\ j)c
)
.
Here, dO(i) :=
∑
j∈O Aij is the degree of node i in O, and vol
(2)(i, j) :=
∑
r∈O AirArj is the
number of paths of length 2 between nodes i and j that pass through O. It is not hard to verify that
these expressions are equivalent to the matrix form presented in (2).
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Recall that vol(I, Ic) =
∑
i,k Aik1{i ∈ I, k /∈ I} and similarity vol(I, j) =
∑
r Arj1{r ∈ I}.
Here, the indices, i, k and r run over all nodes in the network, i.e. i, k, r ∈ [n]. We have
(QTr)j =
∑
I⊂O
1{j 6∈ I} vol(I, j) · vol(I, Ic)
=
∑
I⊂O\{j}
vol(I, Ic) · vol(I, j)
=
∑
I⊂O\{j}
∑
i,k,r
AikArj 1{i ∈ I, k /∈ I, r ∈ I}
=
∑
i,k,r
AikArjγikr
where the last equality follows by interchanging the order of summations and defining
γikr :=
∑
I⊂O\{j}
1{i ∈ I, k /∈ I, r ∈ I}
If i or r do not belong to O \ {j}, or k ∈ {i, r}, then γikr = 0. Thus, it what follows assume that
i, r ∈ O\ j := O \ {j} and k /∈ {i, r}. Then,
γikr = 0

2|O|−4 i 6= r, k ∈ O\ j
2|O|−3 i = r, k ∈ O\ j
2|O|−3 i 6= r, k /∈ O\ j
2|O|−2 i = r, k /∈ O\ j
To see the second equality, note that we are counting subsets of the set O \ {j} (of cardinality
|O| − 1) that contain or exclude certain elements. For example, when k, i, r are pairwise distinct, and
k ∈ O \ {j}, looking at the binary representation of I , we have two ones in the positions i and r and
a zero in position k, and the rest of |O| − 1− 3 positions are free to be zero or one.
Let dS(i) =
∑
j∈S Aij be the degree of node i in S. We drop S when S = [n]. In what follows,
i and r range over O \ {j} (otherwise γikr = 0). Also, condition k /∈ {i, r} can be replaced with
k 6= r, since the k 6= i is implicitly enforced by Aik = 0 if k = i (no self-loops). We have
(QTr)j =
∑
i,r
∑
k 6=r
AikArj
[
2|O|−4(1 + 1{i = r})1{k ∈ O\ j}
+ 2|O|−3(1 + 1{i = r})1{k /∈ O\ j}
]
= 2|O|−4
∑
i,r
dO\{j,r}(i)Arj(1 + 1{i = r})
+ 2|O|−3
∑
i,r
d(O\ j)c(i)Arj(1 + 1{i = r})
where in the second term, we used the fact that if k /∈ O\ j then we automatically have k 6= r since r
ranges over O\ j . We have∑
r
dO\{j,r}(i)Arj =
∑
r
(dO\j (i)−Air)Arj
= dO\j (i)dO\j (j)− vol(2)O\j (i, j)
where vol(2)O\j (i, j) :=
∑
r∈O\j AirArj is the number of paths of length two between i and j in O\j .
Note that vol(2)O\j (i, j) = vol
(2)
O (i, j) and similarly dO\j (j) = dO(j) since Ajj = 0. Thus,∑
i,r
dO\{j,r}(i)Arj
(
1 + 1{i = r}) = ∑
i
[
dO\j (i)dO(j)− vol(2)O (i, j) + dO\j (i)Aij
]
=
∑
i
dO\j (i)dO(j)
= vol(O\j)dO(j)
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where vol(O\j) = vol(O\j , O\j) and the third equality follows since we have∑
i∈A
vol
(2)
A (i, j) =
∑
i∈A
∑
r∈A
AirArj =
∑
r∈A
dA(r)Arj
which was used with A = O\j . Similarly, we have∑
i,r
d(O\ j)c(i)Arj(1 + 1{i = r}) =
∑
i
d(O\ j)c(i)
(
dO\j(j) +Aij
)
= vol((O\ j)c, O\ j) dO(j)
+ vol(adjO(j), (O\ j)c)
It follows that
(QTr)j = 2
|O|−4
[
vol(O\j)dO(j) + 2 vol
(
(O\ j)c, O\ j) dO(j) + 2 vol ( adjO(j), (O\ j)c)].
Calculating QTQ Let us first take j 6= j′. Then, similar to the previous argument,
(QTQ)jj′ =
∑
I⊂O\{j,j′}
vol(I, j) vol(I, j′)
=
∑
I⊂O\{j,j′}
∑
i,r
Aij Arj′1{i ∈ I, r ∈ I}
=
∑
i,r
Aij Arj′βir
where we have defined
βir :=
∑
I⊂O\{j,j′}
1{i ∈ I, r ∈ I}
= 2|O|−41{i 6= r}+ 2|O|−31{i = r}
= 2|O|−4
(
1 + 1{i = r})
assuming i, r ∈ O \ {j, j′}, otherwise βir = 0. Thus, restricting summations over indices i, r ∈
O \ {j, j′}
(QTQ)jj′ = 2
|O|−4
[∑
i,r
Aij Arj′ +
∑
i
AijAij′
]
= 2|O|−4
[
dO\j′(j)dO\j(j′) + vol
(2)
O\{j,j′}(j, j
′)
]
.
Now consider the case j = j′. Then,
(QTQ)jj =
∑
I⊂O\{j}
vol(I, j)2
=
∑
I⊂O\{j}
∑
i,r
Aij Arj1{i ∈ I, r ∈ I}
=
∑
i,r
Aij Arj 2
|O|−3(1 + 1{i = r}),
assuming i, r ∈ O \ j. It follows that
(QTQ)jj = 2
|O|−3
[∑
i,r
Aij Arj +
∑
i
Aij
]
= 2|O|−3
[
dO(j)
2 + dO(j)].
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